Opinion

Modern-day slavery and internal fraud: the UK’s losing battle against ‘invisible’ predicate offences

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An article by Simran Bharaj, GKSB Consultancy, and Claire Maillet, counter-fraud expert

The UK government has said it is committed to combatting dirty money flowing into the country. At the same time, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) continues to cite the reduction and prevention of financial crime as the first commitment in its 2024/25 Business Plan.

At a macro level, in November 2024, David Lammy, the foreign secretary, announced targeted sanctions based on corruption determinations under the Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021, focussed on kleptocrats with illicit funds and a history of corruption. The government must also deliver on its active Fraud Strategy, launched in May last year.

Yet despite steps by government, law enforcement and regulators to address money laundering and fraud, the failure to tackle some of the underlying predicate offences may be hampering all this good work.

Two predicate offences in particular — internal fraud and modern-day slavery in the form of human trafficking — involve vast sums of money. Yet, in the authors' experience, these two predicate offences receive limited attention in firms' financial crime control frameworks compared to other anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) offences and fraud types such as APP scams.

Modern-day slavery and internal fraud

Funds generated from human trafficking are covered under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 as it is classified as a "criminal lifestyle offence" and is unquestionably a predicate offence like fraud and bribery.

A 2013 Home Office report estimated that £130 million was made from trafficking women in the UK and that the average annual revenue generated from one female sex worker was £48,000. This year, the Stop the Traffik charity estimated that global profits from human trafficking exceeded $150 billion. Yet figures quoted in a Home Office report as long ago as March 2012 estimated that female victims were being sold for between £3,000/£4,000. Even then, these figures seemed low in relation to the millions of pounds generated by criminal trafficking rings. Inflation alone means that the figure will have doubled.

Internal fraud cases have increased year-on-year since 2021, according to Cifas data. Additionally, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) estimates that businesses lose 5% of their turnover to internal fraud and that the global average loss per internal fraud case is $1.7 million.

Financial crime frameworks that fail to incorporate these predicate offences are fundamentally flawed, as they are frequently intertwined with the underlying criminal activity. If regulators and law enforcement agencies focus on only one element of criminality, such as money laundering, they are, by default, creating a hierarchy that prioritises some predicate offences over others. This cannot be what the legislation intended; otherwise, it would not have sought to include these predicate offences in the first place.

Regulation, legislation and guidance

There is also the risk that firms may indirectly recognise and address only the predicate offences that are most emphasised by the plethora of formal guidance surrounding them. Governments and regulators cannot intend this, but it is often what happens in practice.

There is a distinct lack of regulation and/or direct regulatory guidance on human trafficking and internal fraud from bodies such as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group. The FCA Handbook contains broad operational risk, system and control requirements that can be connected to internal fraud.

The Financial Crime Guide covers financial crime systems and controls and identifies good and poor practices. It is noticeably silent, however, on internal fraud and human trafficking/modern-day slavery offences and how they should be tackled. Benchmarking analysis is always warmly welcomed by firms struggling to balance what is legally required and gold plating.

The reality of managing any kind of financial crime risk is that firms' compliance budgets will naturally prioritise AML/CFT areas where there are mandatory requirements to have controls in place, specific guidance has been provided and firms know that steep penalties will be imposed for any breaches. This is further enhanced where breaches are well-publicised by both the regulator and the press.

The danger, therefore, is that firms may deprioritise modern-day slavery and internal fraud offences if there is deemed to be less regulatory focus on them or if the rules are insufficiently explicit to be a mandatory legal requirement.

Guidance lacks detail

A case in point is the June 2024 Court of Appeal decision in World Uyghur Congress (WUC) v National Crime Agency (NCA). It found that the NCA had acted unlawfully in deciding not to open a money laundering investigation into the importation and trade of cotton in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.

The proceeds of crime arose due to the forced labour and enslavement concerns brought by WUC and the supporting evidence it had collated regarding their modern-day slavery concerns. They won their case against the NCA, where the case has been referred back to assess if they will reinvestigate. 

The judgment created complex considerations about how and when firms should raise Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and Defences Against Money Laundering (DAMLs) — especially those which are part of a supply chain involved in dealing with suspected criminal property — and how the "adequate consideration exemption" provisions could be applied.

As yet, there is no guidance to support MLROs and nominated officers in making such decisions. The FCA consulted again on updates to the financial crime guide in early December 2024, but there has been little attempt to incorporate these considerations into policy and guidance. Given its significance, prioritising this might have been helpful to the industry.

The same applies to the Home Office's Guidance on the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA). The new failure-to-prevent offence tackles only corporate fraud perpetrated by employees to benefit the firm and fails to address internal fraud. Addressing internal fraud would have been key to systemically reducing fraud loss in the UK. Due to annual turnover requirements, it affects only a small population of mainly larger firms. It appears not to be directed toward internal fraud but rather fraud that directly impacts customers. This was a missed opportunity,

Trust as a regulatory control

Financial services firms' tendency to put their heads in the sand may be another factor in their failure to establish adequate controls. Internal fraud provokes an uncomfortable and emotive response. Firms can find it hard to believe that their staff would ever behave in such a way — until a case presents itself. Even then, there is often a sense of denial that one of their own has turned against them.

In the authors' experience, many firms use this kind of blind trust in their staff as a control method rather than implementing appropriate monitoring systems and controls to identify the risk in the first place.

Internal fraud can also take the form of coercion by bad actors, third parties and/or criminals and is, as a result, an important part of the money laundering ecosystem. Yet the focus sometimes is on the criminal property, not the predicate offences that enabled the crime to take place.

The same can be said of human trafficking and modern-day slavery; here, too, firms find it hard to believe it is something their clients would be involved in. Moreover, human trafficking tends not to be seen as a predicate offence but rather as a sexual crime or act of domestic violence, which is not reflected in the law. The law could be strengthened to make it clearer.

Bolder measures

Government, law enforcement agencies and regulators must recognise that these predicate offences are part of criminal networks' business models. These are not street criminals but shrewd entrepreneurs who use diverse business models to generate income regardless of human and societal costs.

The government must take bolder measures to ensure the industry fully captures its financial crime risk rather than cherry-picking certain crimes. Placing additional compliance burdens on firms will have financial implications, but equally, without a collective response and a consideration of how these crimes work together in practice, nothing will change. Drug traffickers will continue to move contraband through trafficked women treated as slaves. An exclusively drug-focused approach fails to reflect the scale and complexity of the crimes in play.

Prevention is better than cure, yet while the financial services sector has a role to play, so do others. Law enforcement agencies, regulators and the private sector should collaborate, but there must be clearer guidance on what to look for.

It would be helpful for the FCA to complete in-depth thematic reviews into internal fraud and human trafficking as a modern-day slavery offence across the industry to assess the typologies, risks and controls and identify good and poor practices for firms.

While it may never be possible to eradicate such offences, this would help direct firms to reduce the amount of money lost through these crimes and contribute to cutting off criminal gangs' monetary supply at source. 

Simran Bharaj, GKSB Consultancy (FC risk management expert), and an executive committee member for the Institute of Money Laundering Prevention Officers, and Claire Maillet, counter-fraud expert and PhD researcher of internal fraud)