‘Naming and shaming’ firms under UK FCA enforcement investigation: conduit to transparency or unnecessary market suppressor?
Market integrity is a prerequisite for market competition. Without it, the UK's position as a centre of commerce will be compromised.
The Financial Conduct Authority's (FCA) consultation paper CP24/2 on updating the Enforcement Guide (EG) proposes publicising details of firms under investigation, a shift from only announcing such information after issuing a decision notice and penalties.
The proposed disclosure would include the firm's name, industry sector, the regulatory/legal provisions to which the investigation relates and a summary of the suspected breach. It would not name specific individuals under investigation. The consultation has attracted extensive criticism, much of which has focused on concerns about unfair impacts on market competition and economic stability. Arguments about upholding market integrity appear to have been lost in the debate.
Competition concerns
The FCA's reply to the Lords Financial Services Regulatory Committee (LFSRC) confirmed that 67% of enforcement cases result in "no further action." This exacerbated criticism that excessive investigative delays could cause undue reputational damage.
The inherent tension in the FCA's statutory objectives — promoting effective market competition, facilitating UK economic growth and international competitiveness and maintaining market integrity — hinders the FCA from supporting the government's priority of addressing corporate crime. This is reflected in the statistics; Credas rated the UK second in the world for money laundering, while accounting firm BDO's latest Fraudtrack report estimated £2.3 billion in fraud losses in February 2024.
While competition considerations are important, regulators may be more effective with a clear, singular focus. The Competition Markets Authority should lead on competition, just as the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) leads on prudential issues.
Responsibility for competitiveness is a suboptimal fit for the FCA. It creates confusion about the regulator's hierarchy of priorities.
The significance of market competitiveness must be seen in context. It is not designed to "save firms at all costs." This was confirmed by Mary Starks, FCA director of competition and economics, in July 2017. "It is not all upside for firms in an open and competitive market — competition produces losers as well as winners … A common misunderstanding about our competition objective is that we are seeking to improve firms' competitiveness," Starks said.
Firms should not be kept afloat after breaching conduct rules solely based on competition arguments. That would undermine market integrity. A flourishing economy requires a market with strict rules to be credible. The London Stock Exchange is a prime example, where stringent rules ensure a minimum standard, and it remains commercially attractive.
Investigation costs
The industry has expressed multiple concerns that the publication of investigations could be "the final nail in the coffin," given the impact it could have on a firm's reputation. Some fear disastrous commercial ramifications, such as share-value depletion. Still, there is a threshold for referring firms to enforcement and such investigations are only commenced where there are serious concerns that FCA/PRA rules or principles have been breached.
Prior supervisory interventions, such as a section 166 skilled person review and/or restriction of business, often occur before a referral to enforcement. The suggestion that "no further action" means there was no initial case to answer is simply incorrect. Many firms subject to enforcement investigation may need to accept that they are often the protagonists in the situations they face.
Transparency
Arguments focusing on competition also fail to consider the duty of transparency owed to shareholders. Shareholders should be informed if a serious investigation may affect their investment. This would enable investors to exercise their right to hold boards accountable for poor management. A brief statement in the annual accounts for most FTSE 100 firms may not demonstrate the emphasis necessary to ensure full board accountability.
Consistency of application
A fairer criticism is the inconsistency in the regulator's approach to enforcement referrals. There appears to have been a substantial increase in robust supervisory/enforcement intervention in sectors where a less drastic measure could have achieved the same outcome. Examples can be found in the payment services and e-money sectors, which have often been subjected to costly s 166 skilled person reviews, frequently accompanied by business restrictions that can be made public.
Payment services and e-money firms are disruptors to the UK financial services market, the primary competitors to mainstream retail banks. Most are financial technology start-ups that are still adapting to a regulated market. If they make mistakes, a regulator's initial stance could be to afford such firms additional time to complete informal remediation. This may help them learn what is expected, a privilege all major investment/retail banks have long been afforded.
Santander's restriction against onboarding new high-risk business banking customers (confirmed in the FCA decision notice of December 2022) is far less onerous than the complete cessation of regulated activity imposed on payment services firms. This may help to explain the animosity that greeted the consultation.
Another benefit is that the publication of enforcement investigations would help identify concentrations in firm/sector types. This can then be evidentially subject to LFSRC scrutiny to ensure FCA accountability. Until then, the full picture of potential inconsistency remains unquantified.
Encouragement of whistleblowers and witnesses
The consultation states that publication of enforcement investigations is desirable to encourage potential "witnesses and whistleblowers" to step forward "to assist with FCA investigations."
Critical intelligence gathered at the onset of an investigation (partly from whistleblowers) can help establish whether the evidentiary threshold for a regulatory breach has been met. This helps ensure that only investigations with a good prospect of success are opened and expedites the investigative process. This is a strategy being adopted by the Serious Fraud Office.
The consultation has, however, failed to address the obvious barrier to whistleblowers stepping forward: fear of retaliation and loss of professional reputation. This is unfortunate, given that it was detailed in the findings of the FCA's own 2022 whistle-blowing survey.
Money laundering reporting officers and heads of compliance have disclosure obligations to the FCA under the Senior Managers Regime and Principle 11 obligations. They are often placed in impossible situations where they must identify regulatory breaches and disclose them to the FCA if their employer does not accept them.
Many claim they are fearful to make regulatory disclosures in case it damages their work prospects or impacts regulatory references. All are clear examples of retaliation with no clear framework under FCA rules to protect regulated individuals, least of all a wider pool of staff.
In the past 15 years, there has only been one instance of FCA enforcement action over poor governance relating to breaches of whistle-blowing systems and controls. In 2018, it imposed a £642,430 financial penalty against Jes Staley, the then-chief executive of Barclays. Regulators concluded that Staley interfered in an internal investigation to identify the whistleblower, though the decision notice stopped short of defining the intervention as whistleblower retaliation. This is insufficient to create confidence in the FCA.
If the FCA wants whistleblowers to step forward, it must act promptly on their intelligence, drive regulatory action toward a swift conclusion and protect whistleblowers from retaliation by showing a willingness to discipline regulated firms when they do so.
Willingness to listen
The proposal to "name and shame" has been exaggerated as controversial. It is a necessary conduit to transparency and not a unique enforcement approach. However, the execution requires finesse. There needs to be a willingness by the FCA to listen to the industry and make adjustments following the feedback to its consultation process to ensure rules are fit-for-purpose. Perhaps it is the perception of an unwillingness to listen that is the root cause to the angst faced.